Hydropower and End-Use Electrical Efficiency in China: State Support and Potential Contribution to Low-Carbon Development by Magee, Darrin
64 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 33(1)•2015
Darrin Magee _______________________________________________________________
Hydropower and  
End-Use Electrical Efﬁciency in China:  
State Support and Potential Contribution 
to Low-Carbon Development
DARRIN MAGEE
Abstract
This article examines Chinese state support for two 'new energies'—large hy-
dropower and end-use efﬁciency—that aims to help meet ambitious national 
targets for renewable energy and emissions reduction. Large hydropower, while 
not particularly new, ﬁgures prominently in China's renewable energy targets 
and is considered key to achieving renewable output and carbon reduction 
goals. National policies promote widespread development of Gigawatt-scale 
hydropower cascades on China's major rivers, even though the negative impacts 
are signiﬁcant and the operating capacities of large dams are often low. On 
transboundary rivers, China's dam development raises concerns downstream.
Increasing the end-use efﬁciency of electricity represents a more subtle ap-
proach that holds great promise for managing demand and potentially curbing 
new supply. China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
has overseen experimentation with utility-scale 'efﬁciency power plants' that 
free up inefﬁciently-used electricity, resulting in greater power availability 
on the grid. A study by NDRC's Energy Research Institute (ERI) estimated 
that a high penetration rate of LED lighting by 2020, once China completes 
its phase-out of incandescent bulbs, would alone save as much electricity 
annually as the Three Gorges Dam produces. This article demonstrates the 
potential for an efﬁciency-led approach to meeting China's electricity needs. 
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Introduction: A Bright Idea
In 2009, a researcher from China's Energy Research Institute (ERI), an 
arm of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
that advises the NDRC and other key decision-making bodies about 
energy issues, published a report on light bulbs (Liu 2009). Speciﬁ-
cally, the report examined different trajectories, with varying cost and 
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technological assumptions, for meeting China's expected lighting 
needs by 2020, when low-efﬁciency incandescent bulbs are set to be 
completely phased out. Incandescent bulbs, whose design has been 
fundamentally unchanged since their invention in the late 1800s, do 
a poor job of converting electrical energy to light. At efﬁciencies hov-
ering somewhere around 5 per cent, the remainder of the delivered 
electricity from these bulbs is wasted as heat which, despite provid-
ing some modicum of comfort in cold climates, is an irrational and 
uneconomical use of a system designed primarily for light. 
The ERI study examined two scenarios, both involving completely 
displacing incandescent bulbs with a mix of compact ﬂuorescent (CFL) 
and light-emitting diode (LED) bulbs by 2020. CFLs can produce the 
same amount of light as incandescents using approximately one-ﬁfth of 
the energy. LEDs can do it for one-tenth of the energy. The study then 
estimated the annual electricity savings that would result, as compared 
to a base case that assumed incandescents were still part of the mix. 
Factoring in the predicted growth in lighting needs through 2020, the 
study's results were enlightening: the scenario that included higher 
penetration rates of LEDs due to cost and technological breakthroughs 
yielded annual electricity savings of some 85 TWh as compared to the 
base case. That ﬁgure is approximately equal to the annual output of 
the Three Gorges Dam, China's largest hydroelectric project and one of 
the most controversial in the world.1
Contorting an oft-heard joke, one might ask, 'How many light bulbs 
does it take to change China?' Simply put, changing light bulbs is the 
paramount example of what energy efﬁciency experts like to call the 
'low-hanging fruit'. If a nationwide switch from incandescents to more 
efﬁcient and readily available lighting technologies can effectively 
displace the annual output of China's largest hydroelectric plant, or of 
a dozen 1000-MW coal-ﬁred power plants operating at a 90 per cent 
capacity factor, what effect might deeper end-use efﬁciency work aimed 
at even larger electricity users such as industrial pumps, blowers, and 
HVAC2 units have on electricity savings? The scalability of efﬁciency 
measures becomes quite interesting here, given that approximately half 
the world's industrial electricity use is consumed by pumps and fans 
(Lovins and Rocky Mountain Institute 2011: 139).  
In addition to ERI, two other key actors inﬂuencing China's energy 
use and production decision-making processes are the State Council's 
National Energy Commission and the National Development and 
Reform Commission's National Energy Administration. This article 
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examines the Chinese state's support for and the general situation 
of two so-called new energies (xin nengyuan), which are set to play a 
role in the decarbonisation of the Chinese economy: hydropower and 
end-use efﬁciency. Speciﬁcally, it analyzes state policies, progress and 
challenges in relation to large-scale hydropower and end-use efﬁciency 
in the power sector. With the fourth-largest total land area, elevation 
drops among the highest in the world, and more than 23,000 rivers with 
watersheds over 100 km,3 it comes as no surprise that China holds the 
world's greatest hydropower reserves, with gross potential estimated 
at some 694 GW, of which about 540 GW is considered economically 
feasible by China's principal hydropower planning institute.4 By the end 
of 2013, China's installed hydropower capacity stood at roughly half that 
ﬁgure, approximately 280 GW, not including pumped storage plants 
and conventional hydropower facilities with power ratings lower than 
6 MW.5 Yet some of that capacity may be under-utilized; the average 
utilization time of all hydropower in 2013 was only 3318 hours,6 which 
is less than half the 8765.81 total hours in one year, yielding a capacity 
factor of 37.9 per cent.7 
China also stands to gain signiﬁcantly by improving end-use ef-
ﬁciency in all sectors, including the electrical sector. The simplest ex-
ample of this type of 'low-hanging fruit', or what some energy experts 
call 'negawatts', involves nothing more challenging than changing light 
bulbs. In a textbook scenario where a 40 per cent-efﬁcient coal-ﬁred 
power plant delivers electricity to a 5 per cent-efﬁcient incandescent 
light bulb via a transmission and distribution network that is 90 per 
cent-efﬁcient, the overall efﬁciency of the end-use (i.e., lighting) is the 
product of those three efﬁciencies: here a meagre 1.8 per cent. Clearly, 
this is a staggeringly wasteful use of electricity. Yet traditional, central-
ized approaches have focused on improving power plants, which can 
at best lead to incremental improvements given the laws of physics 
and the limits of temperature and materials, and will exceed 50 per 
cent in only the best of cases.8 At the same time, replacing the wasteful 
incandescent bulb—which is, after all, based on technology more than 
a century old—with an LED bulb that uses one-tenth of the electricity to 
produce the same amount of light increases the efﬁciency of the entire 
process to 18 per cent. While there is still much room for improvement, 
that ten-fold increase in end-use efﬁciency means that 90 per cent of the 
fossil-derived energy that would formerly have powered that light bulb 
is now no longer needed.9 
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China's Current Energy Situation
China's quest for secure, reliable and low-carbon energy sources has 
garnered much media attention in recent years. At times the attention 
has focused on the signiﬁcant challenges the Chinese government faces 
in curbing widespread environmental degradation, most notably the pol-
lution of its waters, air and eventually its citizens, with the by-products 
of rapid, intensive and extensive industrial development and moderni-
zation. The most obvious recent example is the suffocating air pollution 
that has enveloped eastern population centres and economic engines 
like Beijing and Shanghai since early 2013. At other times, however, the 
attention has come as a result of the country's apparent progress in the 
development of non-carbon energy sources, which has, despite certain 
setbacks, been impressive. Perhaps most noteworthy has been China's 
deployment of utility-scale wind power installations, which led to an 
annual doubling of installed capacity between 2006 and 2009, and by 
2013 (91,412.89 MW) the level of installed capacity was more than 267 
times greater than it was in 2000 (341 MW).10
According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total energy 
consumption in 2012 amounted to 3,617,320,000 TCE.11 The United States 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) puts that ﬁgure at a compara-
ble, though higher, 109.620 Quads (3,946,253,796 TCE) for the previous 
year.12 This latter ﬁgure is roughly equivalent to 1.12 times the United 
FIGURE 1. China's Electricity Mix
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
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States' consumption of 97.469 Quads, or some 140 times Denmark's 
total energy consumption that same year.13 As shown in Figure 1, fossil 
fuels continue to comprise the vast majority of China's electricity mix. 
Although the rapid increases in renewables over the past decade have 
eroded the fossil share somewhat, the overall trend in energy production 
since the start of the Reform Era (1978), and especially since the high-
growth phase that began in the early 1990s, has been one of heavy reliance 
on an increasingly large gross quantity of fossil fuels (see Figure 2). 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
FIGURE 2. Energy Consumption by Type 
Limits to Coal-Fired Development
There are clear constraints to the business-as-usual approach to meeting 
China's electrical energy needs by building more thermal power supply. 
Not least is China's physical geography, as much of the coal that currently 
powers China is mined in the northeast, while much of the water that 
provides the steam and cooling in thermal power plants is in the south-
east. At the same time, much of the mining, processing and combustion 
of coal for electricity or factory processes takes place in provinces west of 
major centres of population and political power like Beijing and Tianjin. 
Prevailing winds then carry particulates and other pollutants eastward, 
making coal a political liability, both domestically and internationally, as 
emergency hospital visits due to respiratory distress surge as far away 
as Seoul, Korea when eastern China has bad air days (Kim et al. 2008). 
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According to the EIA, China's total carbon dioxide emissions in 2011, the 
most recent year for which data are available, reached 8715.31 million 
metric tons.14 Air pollution in eastern cities has already prompted central 
planners to accelerate development of new coal bases much farther west, 
where pollution is less likely to affect eastern metropolises. However, 
these are also areas where the water resources necessary for thermal 
power production are much less abundant.15
In addition to simple friction of physical geography, it is clear from a 
climate change, air quality, human health or energy security perspective, 
that fossil fuels' share of both primary energy and electricity will have to 
shrink dramatically in the coming decades. Evidence suggests that the 
central leadership of China understands this well, not only because reli-
able energy sources are vital for sustaining economic development and 
lifting more of China's population out of poverty, but also for broader 
socio-political reasons. For the leadership, environmental degradation 
has to be seen as an increasingly important variable in the equation that 
determines the level of so-called social harmony (shehui hexie), or absence 
of social unrest: the most coveted of goals for the Chinese Communist 
Party seeking to maintain its political legitimacy.16
In addition to the air pollution that has smothered China's cities in the 
east in recent years, ofﬁcial data show that one-third of China's river seg-
ments tested in 2012 were contaminated at levels unﬁt for direct human 
contact (Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC 2014).17 The situation 
for lakes and groundwater is much worse: of 112 major lakes and 1040 
groundwater test wells, 80 lakes (72%) and 790 wells (76%) yielded water 
unﬁt for direct human contact (Ministry of Water Resources of the PRC 
2014). Toxic pollutants, such as heavy metals, readily make their way into 
the food chain, as evidenced by the presence of high levels of cadmium in 
more than half of rice samples taken in southern China. In their oxidized 
forms, such metals are exceedingly deleterious to human health; the sci-
ence on this is clear, yet the behaviours have yet to change. From a human 
development perspective, the services provided by that energy—such 
as warmth, light and mobility—will still need to be delivered, only by 
renewable, less polluting and more sustainable energy sources.
Policy Environment
To this end, the Chinese government has enacted a number of laws, 
policies and projects that seem, at least on the surface, to hold some 
promise for improving energy efﬁciency and curbing pollution (see 
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Table 1). Perhaps most important among them is the Renewable Energy 
Law of 2005 (revised in 2009), which, among other things, made commit-
ments to purchase all renewable electricity produced (Art. 14), revised 
renewables subsidies (Art. 24) and speciﬁed penalties for grid companies 
that failed to connect renewables to the transmission and distribution 
network (Art. 29).18 Shortly thereafter, the Top 1000 Energy-Consuming 
Enterprises Program targeted 1000 enterprises responsible for 33 per cent 
of national energy usage and 47 per cent of industrial energy usage. In 
2009, the government set a goal to reduce carbon intensity by 40-45 per 
cent (off a 2005 baseline) by 2020, with an intermediate target of a 17 
per cent reduction by 2015. Given the preponderance of coal in China's 
energy mix, a reduction in energy intensity is roughly equivalent to a 
comparable reduction in carbon intensity. Many of the prescriptions laid 
out in these various policies are now simply referred to collectively as 
part of the 'Energy Savings and Emissions Reduction' (jieneng jianpai) 
policy, now a familiar slogan in energy and environment circles.
TABLE 1. Policy Environment Support for Electrical Efﬁciency
Policy / Project / Plan Date(s)
Energy Conservation Law 1997 (Rev. 2007)
Renewable Energy Law 2005 (Rev. 2009)
Top 1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises 2005
Medium- and Long-term Development Plan for 
Renewable Energy
2007
Promote Big, Squash Small 2007
11th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy 2006-2010
Policy on Energy Savings for Civilian Buildings 2008
12th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy 2011-2015
Incandescent Bulb Phase-Out (3 stages) 2011-2020
The Medium- and Long-term Development Plan for Renewable 
Energy in China (2007) built upon the foundation laid by the Renew-
able Energy Law, mandating that at least 15 per cent of total energy 
consumption in 2020 must come from renewable sources. Whereas that 
speciﬁcation initially targeted primary energy, it was later revised to 
target ﬁnal energy instead.19 This implies an even greater penetration 
of renewables than was outlined in the initial primary energy target 
(Martinot and Li 2010). Importantly, the revised goal speciﬁes 'non-
fossil' sources (as opposed to the earlier use of the term 'renewable'), 
thus bringing nuclear, which presently contributes just two per cent 
_________________________________________________________________________71
____________________________ Hydropower and End-Use Electrical Efﬁciency in China
of China's electricity but is slated for massive expansion, into the mix. 
Large hydropower plants, which have faced scrutiny for their societal 
and environmental impacts, are also included, as they are not technically 
considered to be greenhouse gas-producing installations during normal 
operation. One strength of the 15 per cent mandate is that it sets a target 
for actual electricity output, not simply installed capacity. In recent years, 
total installed wind capacity in China has roughly doubled annually, 
growing faster in many cases than the grid infrastructure needed to 
support and utilize it. Focusing on output rather than installed capacity 
takes into consideration grid connectivity, and the extent to which some 
wind turbines might be standing idle or 'wasting wind' (qifeng) due to 
curtailment or lack of grid connectivity. 
In 2007, the State Council announced an approach to curbing emis-
sions and increasing power generation efﬁciency that came to be known 
as the 'Promote Big, Squash Small' (shangda yaxiao) policy.20 The policy 
targeted the country's oldest and least efﬁcient coal-ﬁred power plants 
(deﬁned the policy as: 'in principle, those rated under 300 MW per 
generator unit'), slating them for closure and, in many cases, demoli-
tion. At a time when foreign news media frequently carried reports of 
'one power plant per week' being completed in China, the 'Promote 
Big, Squash Small' policy ofﬁcially forbade new construction of small 
coal-ﬁred power plants in areas with modern power grid coverage, the 
logic being that cleaner power sources, even if not local, would be grid-
interconnected and therefore available. Moreover, the policy instructed 
grid operators to refrain from providing grid connectivity or related 
services to plants that were constructed without permits or otherwise 
operating illegally. High-proﬁle demolitions of cooling towers broadcast 
on television and the internet (see Figure 3) were clearly intended to 
send a message that the central government was serious about reducing 
emissions and energy intensity. Between 2007 and 2010, more than 70 
GW of coal-ﬁred power plants were shut down.
Other policies targeted narrower sub-sectors of the economy but 
nonetheless form part of China's overall electrical energy use landscape. 
The 'Policy on Energy Savings for Civilian Buildings' (2008) set targets 
for things such as lighting, controls and insulation for residences, gov-
ernment ofﬁce buildings, and commercial and service facilities. Certain 
others were designed as much to increase domestic consumption of 
durable goods as to promote energy-efﬁciency. Indeed, the ﬁrst two 
priorities of the policy to 'Replace Old Household Appliances with New' 
(jiadian yijiu huanxin) are 'to promote expansion of consumer demand 
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and increase efﬁcient use of resources,' in that order.21 Similar consump-
tion-oriented policies with a veneer of energy efﬁciency include the 
'Energy-Efﬁcient Appliances' project (jieneng chanpin huimin gongcheng), 
which offered subsidies on the most efﬁcient models of air-condition-
ers and other consumer goods,22 and the 'Household Appliances to 
the Villages' policy (jiadian xiaxiang), designed speciﬁcally to promote 
consumption of simple household appliances in rural areas. Still oth-
ers, aimed at increasing passenger vehicle fuel economy and similarly 
laudable goals, are beyond the scope of this article.
The Promise and Peril of Large Hydropower in China's 
Energy Goals
China has the world's greatest hydroelectric potential, with technically 
and economically feasible capacity frequently estimated to be potentially 
as high as 540 GW, as previously noted. Yet much of that capacity has yet 
to be developed; according to the China Electricity Council, the country 
had approximately 280 GW of installed capacity at the end of 2013.23 By 
comparison, the EIA puts the installed capacity of the United States at 78 
Source: http://yz.2118.com.cn/news/Html/2010-09-17/64692_1.htm.
FIGURE 3. Series of Photos Showing the Cooling Towers of Two 125-
MW Units at Huaneng's Changxing Power Plant in Zhejiang 
Province being Demolished in September 2010 
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GW at the end of 2011, a ﬁgure that has begun to decline slightly due to 
dam closures and removals. The capacity of Europe is roughly 171 GW, 
and that of Denmark a modest 9 MW. China's hydropower installations 
range from kilowatt-scale micro-hydro stations that provide electricity 
to rural villages, to the massive Three Gorges Dam with its 22.5 GW 
of installed capacity, to cascades of multiple mega-dams such as that 
on the Lancang (upper Mekong) in Yunnan Province, which already 
exceeds 10 GW and will likely grow to nearly double that in the com-
ing decade. Upstream of the Three Gorges Dam, a cascade of nearly a 
dozen dams on the Jinsha (upper Yangtze) is underway. If completed, 
the total installed capacity of that cascade will be four to ﬁve times that 
of the Three Gorges project itself.
Hydroelectric potential depends on elevation drops and river vol-
umes. Actually developing that potential, however, depends on ﬁnancial 
capital, technical expertise, and a favourable policy environment. China 
has plenty of all three. Unlike the situation in many less-developed 
countries elsewhere in the world, most of China's large dams are self-
ﬁnanced, not reliant on development funding and therefore not subject 
to the same reporting and transparency requirements. Dam construction 
companies, all of which were formerly part of the Ministry of Electric 
Power (Magee 2006), beneﬁt from a number of policy supports and, 
perhaps more importantly, from a legacy of direct access to key deci-
sion-makers in the National Development and Reform Commission and 
the State Council. At the founding of the People's Republic of China in 
1949, China had two large dams. Now, most analysts put that ﬁgure at 
between 5,000 and 25,000, depending on how one actually categorizes a 
large dam. In recent years, China's dam industry has become the major 
player in constructing dams overseas, following a policy that encouraged 
power companies and their hydropower subsidiaries to Go Outward 
(zou chu qu). Domestically, policies such as the Western Development 
Campaign (xibu da kaifa), Send Western Electricity Eastward (xidian dong-
song), and Save Energy, Reduce Emissions (jieneng jianpai) have played 
important roles in facilitating hydropower development in western 
regions replete with high mountains and big rivers.
While China's present and projected ﬁgures for installed hydroelectric 
capacity are impressive, the actual role hydropower plays in the over-
all electricity mix in China is much more modest, with total output of 
hydroelectricity accounting for just six per cent of total primary energy 
and roughly 15 per cent of total electricity produced (687 TWh in 2011). 
Developers like Huaneng, Huadian and China Three Gorges Project 
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Corporation have undertaken dozens of high-proﬁle, often controversial 
mega-dams in the past two decades in the southwest of the country. In 
almost all cases, developers claim that these dams will have relatively 
high guaranteed electricity output levels, equating to capacity factors 
between 40 and 50 per cent or higher. For instance, according to ofﬁcial 
ﬁgures, the 4200-MW Xiaowan dam on the Lancang (upper Mekong), 
the tallest concrete arch dam in the world, is expected to have an aver-
age annual output of some 19 TWh, equivalent to a capacity factor of 
51.6 per cent.24 Yet, using the EIA ﬁgures for total installed capacity 
and total hydroelectricity output for the entire country in 2012 (249 GW 
and 687 TWh, respectively), one arrives at an average capacity factor of 
only 31.47 per cent,25 or about two-thirds the world average for hydro-
power (IPCC 2011: 441). The actual build-out of China's hydropower, 
then, will likely be more extensive than it otherwise would be in order 
to compensate for low capacity factors and allow maximum ﬂexibility 
and dispatchability if hydropower is to contribute optimally to reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions.
The Dam Conundrum: Hydropower's Negative Impacts
These data suggest that signiﬁcant trade-offs may arise due to overbuilt 
dams that inundate land near rivers, which is often relatively ﬂat and 
fertile, in a country where arable land is already scarce. As the World 
Commission on Dams (2000) reported in its landmark study, large dams 
around the world come with numerous and signiﬁcant social and envi-
ronmental costs, and almost uniformly fail on a range of benchmarks, 
ranging from construction cost overruns to actual power produced to 
cost overruns. Moreover, in light of the extremely rich cultural and 
biological diversity in areas of south-western China, where the most 
ambitious dam building efforts are underway, the vulnerability of hu-
man- and non-human communities may be even greater. One study 
found, for instance, that local residents' inability to converse easily in 
Mandarin, coupled with their lack of formal education and technical 
skills, makes it exceedingly difﬁcult for them to participate fully in 
modern industrial economic activities (Brown, Magee, and Xu 2008). 
Moreover, China's resettlement policies do not require the resettlement 
of whole communities into the same new location, which frequently 
leads to the rupture of the social ties that form the basis of rural society 
and on which families, trust and even economic relations such as lend-
ing depend. While there is some anecdotal evidence that compensation 
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and resettlement conditions are improving, other evidence suggests 
the resettlement process is still carried out almost as an afterthought, 
especially from a budgetary perspective, in many cases.
The impacts of dams, both positive and negative, vary geographically. 
This is perhaps more true for dams than for other major infrastructure 
projects, especially large dams whose reservoirs stretch for tens if not 
hundreds of kilometres. While communities near the dams are displaced 
and even may see their existing electrical infrastructure submerged or 
otherwise disrupted by dam projects, users on the grid hundreds and 
even thousands of kilometres away beneﬁt from a marginal increase 
in power availability and grid reliability. The literature is replete with 
studies documenting the negative impacts of dams (Scudder 2005; 
McCully 2001; McNally, Magee, and Wolf 2009), yet many of these 
impacts (such as reduction of biodiversity or increases in geopolitical 
tensions) are difﬁcult to measure and therefore do not ﬁgure, at least not 
explicitly, in impact assessments. Moreover, the environmental impact 
assessment process in China is notoriously weak, with assessments 
often conducted by individuals hand-picked by the power companies, 
and the resulting impact statements are often copied almost verbatim 
from one project to another. 
In an attempt to make those impacts more visible and quantiﬁable, 
one interdisciplinary team of scholars developed the Integrated Dam 
Assessment and Modelling framework and software model to model 
and visualize three types of impacts: biophysical, socioeconomic, and 
geopolitical (Tullos et al. 2010; Tullos et al. 2013). The theoretically and 
empirically grounded framework allows users to assess not only the 
objective positive and negative magnitude of 21 impacts, but also to 
assign a salience value to each one, reﬂecting different users' subjective 
evaluation of the importance of each impact and, in principle at least, 
enabling those different users to identify key points of agreement and 
disagreement in order to facilitate more informed and more transparent 
decision-making. Application of the model to pre- and post-dam com-
munities in Yunnan Province, a focal region for large-scale hydropower 
cascade development on the Lancang (upper Mekong), Jinsha (upper 
Yangtze), and Nu (upper Salween) demonstrated that communities in 
the Nu River gorge are, for the reasons noted above (language, technical 
training, and so on) especially vulnerable to the highly localized nega-
tive impacts hydropower development.
Thus large-scale hydropower presents an especially difﬁcult policy 
choice for the generation of China's leaders looking to address a 
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number of troubling challenges, ranging from rural livelihoods on- and 
off-farm, to reducing carbon intensity of GDP and combating climate 
change. As noted above, the fact that China holds the world's great-
est endowment of technically feasible hydroelectric potential in itself 
presents a powerful incentive to harness that energy before it is trans-
ported to the sea. If current trends continue, China's electricity mix in 
the coming decades will derive from an 'all of the above' option that 
embraces new energies such as wind power, solar thermal power, and 
photovoltaics, while continuing to prioritize more traditional power 
sources such fossil thermal (coal and natural gas primarily), nuclear, 
and large-scale hydropower. In addition, despite advances in sun and 
wind forecasting, shifting or smoothing peak electricity demand (load), 
and using large 'balance areas' to compensate for the intermittency of 
solar and wind power, grid operators and power purchasers often see 
spinning reserves (i.e. base-load power plants idling at low capacity 
to provide system redundancy) as the only reliable way of countering 
that intermittency. Even on sunny days or windy nights when solar 
and wind power generators are operating at high capacity factors, a 
fraction of traditional generators, including thermal and hydropower, 
must be kept on standby so that those resources may be quickly and 
easily dispatched to meet any spikes in load or any drop in available 
power resulting from clouds or still air. Failing to do so can lead to 
brownouts, blackouts and loss of economic activity. If some of the nega-
tive impacts of overbuilding China's power supply infrastructure are 
to be avoided or at least mitigated, then power sector decision-makers 
must pay serious attention to alternative yet proven approaches for 
curbing demand, smoothing the electricity load proﬁle and compensat-
ing for renewables' intermittency.
The Case of Three Gorges Dam 
The Three Gorges Dam, in all its concrete and steel splendour and 
obscenity, is unmistakably an engineering masterpiece. It may well 
turn out to be a masterpiece of an engineered mistake, as the problems 
with slope instability, resettlement, corruption, habitat destruction, 
sedimentation and even reservoir-induced seismicity already seem to 
suggest. Yet Three Gorges Dam stands alongside other dams like Bra-
zil's Itaipu, Egypt's Aswan High Dam, and the United States' Hoover 
Dam as a testament to modernization, to humans' attempts to harness 
rivers, master nature and inscribe our mark on the landscape (Kaika 
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2006; McCully 2001). A ﬂood control and power generation structure 
across the Yangtze at Three Gorges had long been in the forefront of 
the minds of Chinese leaders and hydraulic engineers alike, and now 
it stands as China's second Great Wall, symbol of the dramatic mod-
ernization that has swept much of China over the past three decades 
of the Reform Era.
At 22.5 GW of installed capacity, the power machinery of the Three 
Gorges Dam is equivalent to that of nearly 20 large, modern coal-ﬁred 
power plants at 1,000 MW apiece. The dam produces some 85 TWh of 
electricity per year, offsetting approximately 59 million metric tons of 
carbon dioxide that would be produced were that electricity to come 
from coal-ﬁred thermal power plants.26 Yet such a claim is basically 
meaningless, since, as noted above, China's 'all-of-the-above' approach to 
electricity generation means that the Three Gorges Dam, like the dozens 
of other Gigawatt-scale hydroelectric dams being built around the coun-
try, are supplements to, rather than replacements for, fossil-powered 
electricity generation. Moreover, the methane emissions from decaying 
biomass in the dam's 700-km-long reservoir are likely signiﬁcant; one 
study estimated emissions arising from marshes in the reservoir draw-
down area alone (350 km2) to be some 20,556 metric tons per year, not 
a trivial ﬁgure given methane's potency as a greenhouse gas (Chen et 
al. 2009). Nevertheless, for a host of reasons good and bad, the dam 
has drawn the attention of people around the world, attracting visiting 
ofﬁcial and business delegations, along with millions of domestic and 
international tourists each year. During the intense ﬂooding of 2010, 
the recently completed Three Gorges Dam became a media darling, 
feted for controlling the surging waters of the Yangtze and prevent-
ing what would likely have been signiﬁcant losses of life and property 
downstream. Photos such as the one shown in Figure 4 have become 
commonplace in Chinese and international media. 
End-Use Efﬁciency
Changing light bulbs is less photogenic than mega-dams, but no less 
reasonable or valuable—if pursued vigorously and at scale—in meeting 
China's electrical energy needs in the coming decades. As noted above, 
the capacity factors for many of China's hydroelectric facilities, the cor-
nerstone of low-carbon, non-fossil targets, are below world averages. 
This means that the ﬁnancial, societal and ecological costs per kilowatt-
hour of electricity produced from mega-dams are inordinately high. 
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Increasing end-use efﬁciency of electricity usage, meanwhile, effectively 
crowd-sources the solution to meeting China's rising demand for elec-
tricity by empowering and encouraging end users, from consumers to 
factories to municipalities, to implement practices and technologies that 
dramatically improve the utility of delivered electrical energy. Most, if 
not all, of the technologies involved are off-the-shelf, proven and cost-
effective technologies, and are not dependent on elusive technological 
breakthroughs, such as nuclear fusion.
Obviously, changing light bulbs is only part of the solution and is 
intended here as a proxy for a wide array of end-use changes that reduce 
and/or shift electrical loads. These include technologies and practices 
such as smart grid infrastructure, that monitors and manages variations 
in load while sending signals about real-time electricity prices; smart 
appliances and other equipment that react to those real-time price sig-
nals and shift their operations accordingly; variable frequency motors 
in factories that deliver precisely the amount of motive power needed 
for a speciﬁc task; and improved insulation and building design that 
reduces the need for air-handling and space conditioning. This last item 
is especially important in southern China, where peak annual demand 
for electricity comes in summer, when factories and urban areas crank 
up air conditioners to stave off the subtropical heat and humidity. That 
FIGURE 4. Three Gorges Dam Discharging Water
Source: Reuters; Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/gallery/2010/
jul/21/three-gorges-dam#/?picture=365062666&index=0.
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peak in electricity demand corresponds with a peak in the need for ﬂood 
control, as the torrential rains of summer monsoons soak southern China 
and run rapidly off sparsely vegetated slopes and into the rivers. Simply 
put, operations for the same 'multipurpose' dam cannot be simultane-
ously optimized for ﬂood control and power generation.
The policy environment for curbing electrical demand through de-
mand-side-management (DSM)27 practices might be described as favour-
able yet tentative. Part of this stems from the ﬁnancial complexities of 
DSM. In a world where power generators are incentivized to sell kilowatt-
hours, the incentives for curbing demand for those kilowatt-hours are 
not always apparent, and the payoffs resulting from improved end-use 
efﬁciency do not by default accrue directly to power providers. Those 
payoffs to power providers do exist, however, since although end-use 
electricity is often purchased at a ﬁxed price per kilowatt-hour, the cost 
of producing each kilowatt-hour can vary dramatically, simply because 
the marginal cost of producing an extra kilowatt-hour at midnight, when 
demand is low, from a base-load thermal power plant operating at 80 
per cent capacity is far lower than that of producing a kilowatt-hour on 
a hot summer afternoon from an expensive gas turbine peaker plant28 
responding to an unexpected surge in demand or failure of a power plant 
or some other critical power grid component. In the United States, the 
cost for producers to provide peak electricity can be several times higher 
per kilowatt-hour than that of the midnight base-load, even though con-
sumers generally do not see that increased cost reﬂected in their price 
except in the case where smart grid and variable pricing technologies 
and regimes are in place, as described below. 
Scaling the Light Bulb Effect: Efﬁciency Power Plants
Yet at least some energy thinkers in China seem to appreciate, even if 
they underestimate, the potential for demand-side solutions to play a 
role in China's electricity future. Perhaps one of the clearest examples 
for that appreciation can be seen in the efforts to identify and 'construct' 
so-called Efﬁciency Power Plants (nengxiao dianchang). This effort, which 
ﬁrst gained traction around 2005 in Guangdong and 2008 in Jiangsu, 
embraces and seeks to operationalize the concept of the negawatt, or 
energy saved rather than generated. The EPP project, jointly undertaken 
by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and 
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) with funding from 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), scales up the notion of changing 
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light bulbs by incentivizing massive electricity users such as factories 
and municipalities to improve efﬁciency in their usage.29 The value in 
such efforts lies not only in the easily quantiﬁed savings from lower 
electricity bills for those end users, but also—and more importantly—in 
the resources not consumed at the power plant to inefﬁciently produce 
electricity. Clearly, this has important implications in terms of avoided 
CO2 emissions in the case of coal-ﬁred or natural gas-ﬁred power plants. 
According to one report, sixteen enterprises in Jiangsu received funds 
for energy efﬁciency upgrades, resulting in a total savings of 110,890 
MWh over the course of the year,30 roughly equivalent to the output of a 
100 MW coal-ﬁred power plant operating at 80 percent capacity for two 
months, without factoring in transmission, conversion, or distribution 
losses.31 Displacing two months of plant operation would equate to some 
50 metric tons of coal not combusted if the plant were operating with 
40 per cent efﬁciency.32 According to the US Environmental Protection 
Agency, those coal savings would, in turn, save some 76,000 metric tons 
of climate-altering CO2 from being emitted into the atmosphere.33
One example of a pumping loop in a factory is illustrative of the 
energy-savings potential of increased end-use efﬁciency (Lovins and 
Rocky Mountain Institute 2011: 142). In a typical setting where electricity 
is delivered from a thermal power plant via transmission and distribu-
tion lines to a factory, the energy in that electricity must then operate a 
motor, whose motive forces passes through a drivetrain and to a pump, 
in order to ﬁnally move the liquid or gas through a piping loop which, 
depending on its design, might have lots of straight and wide pipes (less 
friction, therefore more efﬁcient) or, conversely, lots of narrow pipes 
with right-angle turns (more friction, therefore less efﬁcient). As shown 
in Table 2, the inefﬁciencies in each step compound to create as much 
as a 90 per cent loss of the energy input at the power plant. Saving one 
unit of energy at the end of the process by, for instance, straightening 
and widening pipes in the pumping loop, can save 10 units or more back 
at the power plant. According to the China Electricity Council, China's 
heavy industry used 3,209.2 TWh of electricity in 2013, while light indus-
try used 637.9 TWh. Not only were both these ﬁgures up more than six 
per cent from the previous year, they also accounted for 60 per cent and 
12 per cent, respectively, of the entire country's 2013 electricity use over 
all sectors. Improvements in pumping loops, lighting, space condition-
ing, controls and similar areas across the industrial sector that led to a 
modest 20 per cent reduction in end-use electricity, then, would mean 
a savings of 769 TWh in delivered (end-use) electricity at the factory, 
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and roughly ten times that at the thermal power plant.34 That ﬁgure, 
in turn, is approximately equivalent to the amount of hydroelectricity 
produced by all of China's hydroelectric dams in 2013.35
TABLE 2. Energy Loss in a Pumping Loop
Process Component Energy Loss (%)
Power plant 67
Transmission and Distribution 10
Motor 10
Drivetrain 2
Pump 25
Throttling Valve 33
Pipe 20
Source: Adapted from Lovins & Rocky Mountain Institute (2011: 142).
According to academic studies and media reports, the EPP approach 
seems to have gained some traction not only in Guangdong and Jiangsu, 
but also in Beijing, Shanghai, Hebei, Sichuan and Chongqing.36 NRDC 
reports an ambitious EPP project in Hebei that aimed to identify 1000 
MW (1 GW) of electrical capacity in that province from 2009 to 2013. 
One year in, however, the project had only accumulated one-tenth of 
that amount, suggesting that at least some of the so-called low-hanging 
fruit in energy savings might not be so readily available or apparent. 
Two structural impediments likely explain why the EPP approach has 
yet to be more widely deployed or to produce more savings. First, as 
noted above, are ﬁnancing questions that, at their most basic level, 
revolve around the question of who pays the up-front costs for utility-
scale efﬁciency upgrades. Some innovations are being made, however, 
in order to advance EPP work without the support of outside funding 
agencies such as the Asian Development Bank (Yin and Wen 2013). Such 
innovations could include a small surcharge on every kilowatt-hour of 
electricity produced by utilities, which would pay into a fund used to 
support or subsidize end-use efﬁciency upgrades. Second, energy prices 
in China, including electricity prices, are suppressed, so energy is fairly 
cheap to end users, thus further disincentivizing upgrades that factory 
managers or municipal leaders might see as prohibitively expensive, 
or changes in practices that might seem logistically or culturally chal-
lenging. Finally, different standards for Evaluation, Measurement and 
Veriﬁcation (EM&V) across administrative regions and projects may 
complicate EPP work in the short term.
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Making the Grid Smarter
Smart grid technology represents another promising solution to meeting 
a portion of China's current and projected electricity needs by curbing 
peak demand and therefore reducing the need for rapidly-dispatched 
peaker plants whose operating costs per kilowatt-hour generated, 
as noted above, can be quite high. So-called Demand Response (DR) 
activities, in which end users shift electricity-intensive operations to 
a time of day when demand is lower, are a key component of making 
this strategy work, and are dependent on a grid that transmits not only 
electricity, but also information. China's State Grid Corporation, one of 
the two major grid operators, has undertaken large-scale smart meter 
installations across the country in a three-phase programme aimed at 
realizing a nationwide smart grid by 2020. Investment in 2013 alone 
topped USD$4.3 billion.37 Smart meters are an essential component of 
the system, allowing bidirectional communications over power lines so 
that information such as real-time electricity price can be transmitted 
to electricity users in homes, ofﬁces and factories. Those users or their 
communications-enabled 'smart devices' can then react accordingly, 
in some cases opting to shift non-time-sensitive electricity-consuming 
activities to a time of day when the real-time price is lower. 
The deployment of smart meters has not been entirely straightforward 
however. Some users complained of higher usage levels and higher 
electricity bills once the smart meters were installed.38 Grid operators 
responded that this was due to the greatly increased sensitivity of smart 
grids that enabled them to detect very small but persistent loads such 
as DC transformers for phone chargers. Despite such bumps in the 
road, a grid architecture that reliably transmits information as well as 
electricity is vital to the success of DSM measures. The announcement 
in November 2014 that Shenzhen would take the lead in decoupling 
grid company revenues from actual power sales, thereby opening the 
door to removing disincentives for utilities to reduce electricity usage, 
is an important step in a larger programme to allow efﬁciency and 
demand-side behavioural changes to be treated as positives in the gen-
eration ledger, not simply as negatives in the demand ledger.39 Given 
that reforms to separate generation from transmission and to reduce 
monopolistic practices and pricing began in the late 1990s, such a step 
is long overdue.
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Conclusion
On 18 April 2014, less than a week before Earth Day, Chinese Premier 
Li Keqiang addressed the National Energy Commission to lay out 
priorities for reforming China's energy sector.40. Li's call for increased 
development of nuclear power along the east coast 'at the appropriate 
time' captured the headlines, and his promotion of large hydropower 
cascades in the west, along with unconventional fossil fuels such as 
coal-bed methane and tight shale gas, followed shortly behind. Yet he 
also noted that a reformed Chinese energy sector must focus on im-
proving efﬁciency of energy use across the economy, including more 
efﬁcient electricity dispatch models. As increases in end-use efﬁciency 
and renewable energy sources—including intermittent sources such as 
solar and wind—combine to alter China's electricity load proﬁle, power 
grid operators will need to depend on better electricity dispatch models 
in order to ensure balance41 on the grid and minimize wasteful use of 
traditional energy sources at times when renewables are abundant.
There is reason for optimism about a dramatically different energy 
future for China. Continued reliance on fossil-fuels for the vast majority 
of primary energy and electricity in China will have tangible and costly 
effects on the environment, people, economy and social stability of 
China. For a government whose ﬁrst priority is the maintenance of social 
stability, the business-as-usual approach to energy provision and use is 
simply not a viable option for the coming decades. Central government 
support of large-scale pilots in efﬁciency, and precedent-setting instal-
lations of renewables such as wind, solar and hydropower is encourag-
ing, though the fondness for mega-projects such as the Three Gorges 
Project and other world ﬁrsts may not always prioritize the solutions 
with the greatest overall ration of beneﬁts to costs, when those costs are 
fully counted. As noted above, though, hydroelectricity will continue to 
play an important role in China's electricity and overall energy mix, and 
perhaps a larger role than is currently foreseen if improvements in grid 
operation lead to greater reliance on hydropower in order to offset the 
intermittency of solar and wind power.42 Of China's 23,000 rivers with 
watersheds over 100 km2, the country's principal hydropower planning 
institute in Beijing estimates that more than 3,800 have hydroelectric 
potential of more than 10 MW.43 
Further cause for guarded optimism lies in the results of recent and on-
going studies examining various scenarios for a renewable, low-carbon 
energy future for China. In 2012, China's Energy Research Institute (ERI) 
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and China National Renewable Energy Center (CNREC) undertook the 
'2050 High-Penetration Renewables Study and Roadmap',44 which aimed 
to examine the feasibility of high renewables in the power sector by 2050, 
as well as lay out technological and policy strategies for achieving that 
goal. While the results of the study have not yet been fully released to 
the public, initial reports suggest the ﬁndings, while promising, may 
be somewhat modest in terms of the level of renewables found to be 
economically feasible and technologically sound from a grid stability 
perspective. A second study published recently by WWF and the Energy 
Research Transition Institute estimated that generating 80 per cent of 
China's electricity from renewable sources by 2050 was both technically 
and economically feasible (Chandler et al. 2014). The WWF study exam-
ined four scenarios—Baseline, High Efﬁciency, High Renewables, and 
Low Carbon Mix—and found that the High Renewables scenario (built 
on High Efﬁciency but prioritizing renewable supplies where available) 
was both technologically and economically feasible, and preferable, due 
to its simultaneous focus on improving efﬁciency, reducing emissions 
and eliminating new construction of nuclear power. 
Finally, a study by US-based energy think-tank Rocky Mountain In-
stitute demonstrated that a non-fossil-powered United States by 2050 is 
not only economically and technically feasible, but economically quite 
compelling at a cumulative net saving of some $5 trillion compared to the 
business-as-usual case (Lovins and Rocky Mountain Institute 2011). RMI 
is currently undertaking a similar study in China to determine the extent 
to which China's power, industrial, building and transportation sectors 
could be de-fossilized by 2050. While China's hydropower endowments 
mean hydroelectricity will play a larger role in China's electricity mix 
than in the US, the role of end-use efﬁciency will also be signiﬁcant, as 
suggested by the light bulb example at the beginning of this article. Fol-
lowing the promising ﬁndings of its US study, RMI, along with China's 
Energy Research Institute and Lawrence Berkeley National Lab's China 
Energy Group, is currently applying the Reinventing Fire methodology 
of efﬁciency and renewables to China. Speciﬁcally, the study aims to 
determine just how great a role efﬁciency and renewables could play 
in the China's energy mix in 2050, and departs signiﬁcantly from the 
'build more supply' model that has largely guided the development of 
China's power sector thus far.
Reinventing Fire – China is ambitious and adopts a different prioritiza-
tion of solutions, beginning with radically decreasing demand through 
end-use efﬁciency in the power sector, along with three other sectors 
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(buildings, transportation and industry) that all have their own electric 
power demands. Once all economically and technically feasible efﬁcien-
cies have been realized, the methodology stipulates that the second 
tranche of power needs be met with renewables. Here, some adaption 
of the methodology may be necessary due to the different policy priority 
nuclear power is likely to have in China, despite its less-than-promising 
economic characteristics, primarily from a risk pricing perspective in 
a post-Fukushima world where private investors are increasingly un-
willing to underwrite that risk. Thus 'renewables' may have to include 
what Chinese energy planners refer to as 'non-fossil' (fei huashi) and 
'clean' (qingjie) sources. 
RMI's approach strongly prioritizes solutions that are economically 
feasible with very short to negative payback times, but recognizes that 
certain changes in the way inputs and outputs such as coal, carbon 
dioxide and kilowatt-hours are priced may be necessary to make those 
economic advantages more apparent. Two areas that are emphasized 
more strongly in the RMI study than in existing studies are integrative 
design and distributed renewables. Integrative, whole system design 
describes a systems approach that tries to capture multiple beneﬁts from 
single components, targeting systems as simple as a supporting beam 
in a building that also provides thermal mass, or as complex as a city 
(Lovins 2010). China's massive urbanization push from now to 2030 
will mean many new cities will be built from the ground-up, allowing 
efﬁciencies to be designed into the city systematically rather than retro-
ﬁtted later. Meanwhile, a focus on maximizing distributed renewables 
as part of China's developing grid architecture supports grid reliability, 
a key government priority, through larger geographic balance areas for 
renewables and decreased costs for long-distance transmission, both 
the ﬁnancial costs of construction and maintenance and the energy 
costs of line losses. One can only hope that the results of studies such 
as the three mentioned here reinforce each other and combine to make 
a compelling case for implementation before the costs of transitioning 
away from fossil fuels grow even higher.
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NOTES
1  Three Gorges is controversial not merely because of its size, but also because its re-
servoir, over 600 km long, displaced some 1.3 million people and radically changed 
aquatic and riparian habitats for a number of species, including the baiji (Yangtze 
freshwater dolphin), now suspected to be extinct. The Three Gorges Dam reservoir 
is also suspected as a culprit in the devastating 2008 earthquake in Wenchuan, as the 
sheer weight from the reservoir's water likely triggered the quake in a fault-ridden 
and quake-prone area of western China.
2  Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning.
3   A study released in 2013 by the Ministry of Water Resources put the ﬁgure at 22,909 
rivers, a downward revision from earlier estimates of more than 50,000. MWR 
claimed that newer, more reliable technologies and practices for accounting for these 
rivers was the primary reason, but also admitted that climate change and economic 
development patterns play a role. See http://www.mwr.gov.cn/2013pcgb/merge1.
pdf. Accessed 22 April 2014. 
4  See China Institute of Water and Hydropower Planning (IWHR) 2011 report, 
'Shuidian kaifa de xianzhuang he qianli' (Status and Potential of Hydropower Devel-
opment), available at http://www.iwhr.com/zgskyww/ztbd/dbzhw/second/we-
binfo/2011/01/1294879660871389.html. Accessed 23 March 2014.
5   See China Electricity Council's '2013 quanguo dianli gongye tongji shuju yilanbiao' (An-
nual Report on National Electricity Statistical Data), available at http://www.cec.
org.cn/guihuayutongji/tongjxinxi/yuedushuju/2014-01-26/116224.html. Accessed 
22 April 2014.
6   Ibid.
7   Author's calculation.
8   One measure of maximum theoretical efﬁciency of a thermal power plant is its Car-
not efﬁciency, calculated by ﬁrst taking the difference between the maximum steam 
temperature and the minimum condensing water temperature applicable to a given 
plant, then dividing that difference by the maximum temperature and multiplying 
the result by 100 per cent. For this calculation to work, all temperatures must be in 
Kelvins.
9   Author's calculations.
10   See annual reports of the Chinese Wind Energy Association (CWEA), available at 
http://www.cwea.org.cn. 
11   See National Bureau of Statistics at http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/
index?m=hgnd. Accessed 10 April 2014. 
12   See Energy Information Administration at http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-
data.cfm?ﬁps=CH&trk=m#cde. Accessed 10 April 2014.
13  For US figure, see EIA at http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.
cfm?ﬁps=US#tpe. For Denmark ﬁgure, see http://www.eia.gov/countries/coun-
try-data.cfm?ﬁps=DA#tpe. Accessed 17 April 2014.
14   See EIA at http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?ﬁps=CH&trk=m#cde. 
Accessed 12 April 2014.
15   See, for instance, Bloomberg News 6 March 2014, 'China outsourcing smog to west 
region stirs protest' at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-06/china-out-
sourcing-smog-to-west-region-stirs-protest.html. Accessed 4 December 2014.
16   See, for instance, an article that appeared on the state-run Xinhua news website 
on 10 September 2014 entitled 'Hexie huajie huanjing wuran jiufen' (Harmoniously 
resolve environmental pollution disputes), available at http://news.xinhuanet.
com/energy/2014-09/10/c_1112422960.htm. Accessed 4 December 2014.
17  According to the Chinese water quality classiﬁcation system, Grades I-III are suitable 
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for use and/or treatment as drinking water; Grade IV is suitable for industrial use; 
and Grade V is suitable for irrigation and so-called landscape use. There is also a 
sixth category, labeled 'V Acute' (jian wu lei) for water whose quality is poorer even 
than Grade V. In this classiﬁcation system, 'Unﬁt for direct human contact' includes 
Grades IV, V and V Acute.
18   Full text of the law in Chinese is available at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/
law/798072.htm. Accessed 22 April 2014.
19   Primary energy is an energy resource in its original form (e.g., crude oil, natural gas, 
uranium), before that resource has been transformed into a ﬁnal form (e.g., reﬁned 
fuels, electricity). 
20   See 2012 announcement, 'Guowuyuan pizhuan fazhan gaige wei, nengyuanban 
guanyu jiakuai guanting xiaohuodian jizu yu yijian de tongzhi' ('State Council Ap-
proves and Transmits NDRC, Energy Ofﬁce Notiﬁcation on Speeding the Closure 
of Small Thermal Plants'), available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-01/26/con-
tent_509911.htm. Accessed 10 April 2014.
21  In Chinese, 'Cujin kuoda xiaofei xuqiu, tigao ziyuannengyuan liyong xiaolü' (Pro-
mote the Expansion of Consumption, Improve the Efﬁciency of the Use of Natural 
Resources). Full text of the policy is available on the Ministry of Commerce website at 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/d/200907/20090706383517.html. Accessed 
20 April 2015.22 See 2009 announcement, 'Liang bumen gonggao 'jieneng chanpin 
huimin gongcheng' kongtiaoqu tuiguang mulu' ('Two Ministries Announce 'Energy-
Efﬁcient Appliances Project' Promotional Catalog'), available at 'http://www.gov.
cn/gzdt/2009-06/02/content_1329773.htm. Accessed 10 April 2014.
23   See China Electricity Council's '2013 quanguo dianli gongye tongji shuju yilanbiao' 
('Annual Report on National Electricity Statistical Data'), available at http://www.
cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/tongjxinxi/yuedushuju/2014-01-26/116224.html. Ac-
cessed 22 April 2014.
24   See China Society for Hydropower Engineering (2010), 'Huaneng Xiaowan shuidi-
anzhan nian fadianliang tupo 100 yi qianwashi' ('Huaneng Xiaowan Hydropower 
Station Annual Output Surpasses 10 TWh'), available at http://www.hydropower.
org.cn/showNewsDetail.asp?nsId=3745. Accessed 11 April 2014.
25   Author's calculations.
26   Carbon dioxide emissions ﬁgure calculated using the EIA's Calculations and Ref-
erences page at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/refs.html. 
Accessed 20 April 2015. 
27   As the name implies, Demand Side Management (DSM) practices and technologies 
seek to address energy supply and demand mismatch through curbing demand, 
rather than the more common practice of building more supply. For instance, a 
projected shortfall of 100 MW in a certain portion of the power grid could either 
be ﬁlled by constructing a new power plant, or by ﬁnding ways to reduce demand 
(through better light bulbs, motors, and the like) by 100 MW.
28   Peaker plants are plants with high ramp rates (MW/min), that is, whose power 
output can be rapidly increased to meet an unforeseen peak in demand. More costly 
versions of these plants include gas turbine plants. Cheaper, though harder to site, 
are pumped-storage and conventional hydropower plants.
29   See the Natural Resources Defense Council's description of EPP work in Jiangsu at 
http://www.nrdc.cn/DSM/datashare_download.php?id=1416&cid=295. Accessed 
17 April 2014.
30   See ChinaPower report on 11 February 2009, 'Jiangsu Taizhou nengxiao dianchang 
huo 500 wan zijin zhichi' ('Jiangsu Taizhou EPP Receives 50 Billion Yuan in Fund-
ing'), available at http://www.chinapower.com.cn/newsarticle/1084/new1084235.
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asp. Accessed 19 April 2014.
31   Author's calculation.
32   Author's calculation.
33   See EPA calculator at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/calcula-
tor.html#results. Accessed 20 April 2014.
34   Author's calculations.
35   The National Bureau of Statistics reported 698.95 TWh of hydroelectric output in 
2011. An increase of 10 per cent to 769 TWh in 2013 corresponds to the increase in 
installed hydroelectric capacity over that same period. See http://www.stats.gov.
cn/tjsj/. Accessed 22 April 2014.
36   See Natural Resources Defense Council's 'Yi butong moshi jiang 'nengxiao dian-
chang' xiang gengduo shengshi tazhan' ('Using Different Models to Expand EPPs to 
More Provinces and Cities'), available at http://www.nrdc.cn/our_program_mon.
php?id=853&cid=125. Accessed 19 April 2014.
37   A Xinhua news report on 25 February 2014 announced that at USD $4.3 billion, Chi-
na's investment in smart grid technology had surpassed that of the United States for 
the ﬁrst time. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-02/25/c_119499578.
htm. Accessed 23 April 2014.
38   See 2011 commentary on a Jiangxi news site, 'Gongdianju bianxiang zhangjia, zhineng 
dianbiao qiequ laobaixing de dianfei' ('Power bureau covertly raises prices, steals 
common people's electricity fees') at http://dev.jxnews.com.cn/yw/ms/view.
php?id=2094. Accessed 19 April 2014.
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